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Abstract: 
This work examines differences in the level of violence of counterterrorism measures adopted by 
Central Asian states. Why do some Central Asian governments opt for wanton repression in the 
name of the struggle with terrorism, while others adopt less severe methods of control and 
prevention? To answer this question, the study draws on a synthesis of rationalist and constructivist 
explanations. Like rationalists, it posits that the magnitude of terrorism and states’ material 
capabilities affect the governments’ responses to terrorism. Following constructivists, the study 
stresses the impact of ideas about the nature of terrorist threat, and views on the appropriateness 
of the use of force on counterterrorism policies of Central Asian states. 
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Abstract 
This work examines differences in the level of violence of counterterrorism 
measures adopted by Central Asian states. Why do some Central Asian governments opt 
for wanton repression in the name of the struggle with terrorism, while others adopt less 
severe methods of control and prevention? To answer this question, the study draws on a 
synthesis of rationalist and constructivist explanations. Like rationalists, it posits that the 
magnitude of terrorism and states’ material capabilities affect the governments’ responses 
to terrorism. Following constructivists, the study stresses the impact of ideas about the 
nature of terrorist threat, and views on the appropriateness of the use of force on 
counterterrorism policies of Central Asian states.  
 
 
Governments challenged by the threat of terrorism respond to terrorist acts in 
different ways. Some states go to extremes to root out terrorism using widespread 
repression not only of terrorists but of innocent civilians as well, while others rely on less 
severe mechanisms of control and prevention. What explains this variation? 
This inquiry focuses on the counterterrorism responses of Kazakhstan, the Kyrgyz 
republic, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. After the collapse of the USSR, 
political elites of these Central Asian states instituted openly non-democratic regimes 
variously labeled as ‘authoritarian presidentialism’, ‘neopatrimonial regimes’, or ‘personal 
dictatorships’.1 The differences in the extent of repression committed by these non-
democratic states in the name of the struggle with terrorism constitute an interesting 
empirical puzzle. 
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To explain the puzzling differences in the level of repression used by the Central 
Asian governments in the context of struggle with terrorism, this study resorts to a 
combination of Rationalist and Constructivist explanations of state behavior. It posits that 
the incidents of political violence and terrorism in the region and states’ material 
capabilities are important, albeit, insufficient determinants of the states’ counterterrorism 
measures. Ideas about the nature of terrorist threat and appropriate responses to it also 
influence governments’ interpretations of political violence and subsequent reactions to it. 
The study examines historical and social contexts that gave rise to particular meanings of 
the terrorist threat in Central Asia and ideas about effective and acceptable responses to 
political violence. 
The sample of the selected cases is well suited for systematic comparisons. One of 
the criticisms of small-n comparative designs is that they try to account for too many 
variables using too few cases, thus, producing findings that lack internal validity.2 If case 
studies isolate and test the impact of a few variables, they are criticized for not accounting 
for other ‘extraneous’ factors that may influence the outcome in question. The large-n 
studies control for those ‘extraneous’ effects statistically. This study ‘controls’ for 
confounds by selecting cases that evince many institutional and cultural similarities.  
All Central Asian states share the history of domination by Tsarist and Soviet 
Russia. The outdated Communist-era political structures, predominance of political 
interests and ideology as defined by the central government, narrowly specialized 
dependent economies and inefficient systems of resource management are the legacies of 
the soviet regime.3 Currently, all Central Asian states are subject to geopolitical 
competition, continuing influence and intervention of their ‘past colonial and Soviet 
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master, Russia’, and mounting challenges of Islamic fundamentalism.4 The majority of 
Central Asians belong to Hanafi Sunnism, the most tolerant and liberal school of thought 
of Sunni Islam. Being a Muslim in Central Asia is a part of the local identity. For many 
people it is defined by adherence to traditions and customs rather than strict observance of 
Islamic rituals.5
The least visited and studied ex-Soviet Central Asian republics have recently 
caught attention of many world powers. The world cares about Central Asia for two 
reasons: the region’s phenomenal deposits of oil and natural gas and its frontline position 
in the global fight against terrorism and organized crime. The United States has energy 
security, strategic and commercial interests in the region. The US policy goals regarding 
Central Asian energy resources include the promotion of independence and stability of 
Central Asian states and their ties to the West, diversification of Western energy suppliers 
and encouragement of the construction of east-west pipelines that do not transit Iran.6 The 
ongoing instability in South and Southwest Asia and the war on terrorism necessitate an 
enduring US military presence in Central Asia. Interests in the energy resources and 
security of the region swept away any uncertainty about Central Asia’s importance to the 
US and international system. 
This study is composed of four sections. The first section defines counterterrorism 
and details counterterrorism policies of the Central Asian states. The second section lays 
out theory-based explanations of differences in the level of violence of counterterrorism 
responses followed by evaluation of empirical evidence in five case studies. Section three 
discusses the findings of case studies and draws attention to the dynamic of interaction of 
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brutal counterterrorism measures and instances of political violence in the region. The 
overview of the study is presented in the final part.   
The primary sources of data for this analysis are states’ reports detailing their 
counterterrorism measures submitted to the Counter-Terrorism Committee (the CTC) of 
the United Nations,7 the annual country reports on human rights practices of the US 
Department of State,8 and reports of international human rights organizations – Amnesty 
International and Human Rights Watch. The information on illegally detained, prosecuted 
and executed individuals charged with the crime of terrorism contained in the reports has 
been verified through the analysis of news wires of the regional media using the Lexus-
Nexus search engine and reports of the local human rights organizations (in Russian). 
Additionally, the legislative databases of Central Asian States were analyzed.9  
Counterterrorism Policies of the Central Asian States 
Counterterrorism is a multifaceted policy aimed at prevention and combat of 
terrorism through a combination of political, legal, diplomatic and security measures.10 
The analysts of counterterrorism typically characterize states as ‘soft-’ or ‘hard-liners’,11 or 
classify counterterrorism programs into the ‘war’ or ‘criminal justice’ models.12 Common 
to these and similar typologies of counterterrorism is the idea that the degree of states’ 
deviation from the rule of law and internationally protected human rights under the pretext 
of fighting with terrorism varies across states.  
The governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan adopted extensive counterterrorism programs and legislation to combat 
terrorism and religious extremism, criminalized terrorist activity and terrorism-related acts. 
They established counterterrorism institutions with almost identical functions and 
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authority. The counterterrorism legislation of all Central Asian states reiterates principles 
of the rule of law and respect for human rights. Yet, all Central Asian governments went 
astray from the proclaimed standards. The extent of violation of human rights, liberties and 
prerogatives of law varies across the states of the region (see Table 1).  
The government of Uzbekistan went to extremes to liquidate radical Islamic groups 
blamed for a series of terrorist attacks in the state. Uzbek authorities have persecuted, 
hunted down, assaulted and incarcerated Muslim fundamentalists13. Gradually, the 
government’s repression has spread to moderate Islamic believers.14 Uzbek courts have 
handed down harsh punishments for terrorism-related acts as well as for less serious 
activities, such as the dissemination of materials intended to undermine public order. The 
courts’ rulings have been based on the flimsiest of evidence of the defendants’ guilt in the 
alleged crimes.15 Unfair trials, systematic torture and ill-treatment have become a routine 
in Uzbekistan. Reported disappearances, death sentences and executions have been a big 
concern of the international human rights groups.16 In the context of the ‘war on 
terrorism’, the government has been using war-like means to chase, crackdown on and 
eradicate Islamic militants. The scores of civilians perished as a result of excessive force 
used by the Uzbek security forces during the counterterrorism operations.  
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Table 1. Counterterrorism Policies of the Central Asian States  
 
 Uzbekistan Tajikistan Turkmenistan Kazakhstan Kyrgyzstan  
Legislative 
Framework 
Program of 
Measures to 
Strengthen Efforts to 
Combat Reactionary 
Extremism and 
Terrorism (2000); 
Act On Combating 
Terrorism (2000) 
Program for 
Intensifying Efforts 
to Combat Terrorism 
for the period 1998-
2000 (1997);  
Act On Combating 
Terrorism (1999) 
Act On Combating 
Terrorism (2003) 
Act On Measures to 
Combat Terrorism 
(1999);  
Program for 
Combating 
Terrorism and Other 
Forms of Extremism 
and Separatism 
(2000) 
Act On Combating 
Terrorism (1999); 
State Program for 
Combating 
Terrorism and Other 
Forms of Extremism 
and Separatism 
(2000) 
Institutions 
Responsible 
for Counter-
terrorism 
 
 
  
National Security 
Service; Ministries of 
Internal Affairs, 
Defense and 
Emergency 
Situations; and 
Committees on the 
Protection of State 
Border and Customs  
Ministries of 
Security, Internal 
Affairs, Defense and 
Emergencies; 
Committee on the 
Protection of State 
Border; and 
Presidential Guard  
Ministries of 
National Security, 
Internal Affairs and 
Defense; Security 
Service of the 
President; and State 
Border and Customs 
Services 
National Security 
Committee; 
Ministries of Internal 
Affairs and Defense; 
and Security Service 
of the President 
National Security 
Service; Security 
Council; Ministries 
of Internal Affairs 
and Defense; 
Customs and Border 
Services; and Office 
of the Prosecutor-
General 
Courts’ 
Penalties  for 
Terrorism 
and Related 
Acts    
20-25 years of 
imprisonment or 
death penalty; 10-25 
years for less serious 
acts 
5-25 years of 
imprisonment or 
death penalty; 1-18 
years for less serious 
crimes 
5 years to life 
imprisonment  
4-18 years of 
imprisonment; 2-5 
years for less serious 
acts 
10-25 years in prison 
or death penalty; a 
fine or up to 8 years 
in prison for less 
serious acts 
Counter-
terrorism 
Policy ‘Style’  
Repressive and 
aggressive. Unfair 
trials, systematic 
torture and ill-
treatment of suspects 
Less repressive than 
in Uzbekistan. 
Intense surveillance 
and control. Use of 
excessive force 
Stern political 
control. Widespread 
repression following 
assassination attempt 
in 2002 
More balanced 
approach combining 
coercion and 
cooption, control and 
assimilation 
Lenient and tolerant 
policy in the1990s. 
Repression of the 
radical Islamists 
since 1999  
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The government of Tajikistan has also been known for harsh prosecution of Islamic 
militants. During the course of a five-year Tajik civil war, the governmental troops used 
indiscriminate fire in military operations against Islamists. The 1997 peace agreement 
brought fighting to an end and ensured representation of the Islamic Renaissance Party 
(IRP), which fought on the side of the opposition, in the governmental structures. 
However, the IRP’s activities have been hampered by a renewed persecution.17 Tajik 
officials launched criminal investigations against former fighters on the grounds of various 
grave crimes, including terrorist acts, allegedly committed during the civil war. The IRP 
maintains that trials and sentencing are politically motivated to discredit the party.18 
Several years after the termination of fighting, the government continued using war-like 
means to liquidate the remnants of the armed militants whom the governments labeled 
‘terrorists’, ‘bandits’ and ‘gangsters’. During the retaliatory attacks launched by the 
government forces in the summer 2001, dozens of locals lost their houses, livestock and 
lives.19 The members of radical Islamic groups have also been subjected to intense 
surveillance and prosecution. Local monitors and journalists allege that defendants charged 
with participation in or support of the activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir, an extremist Islamic 
political organization banned in the state, had unfair trials and were abused and tortured in 
detention to extort confessions.20
Until recently, Turkmenistan lacked a distinct counterterrorism policy. The 
sweeping national security measures and stern political control compensated for the 
paucity of the specific counterterrorism measures. The President of Turkmenistan, 
Saparmurat Niyazov, has personified the state, state power, state unity and national 
legitimacy. Consequently, national security of the Republic has been tantamount to 
Omelicheva, Mariya Y. Combating Terrorism in Central Asia: Explaining Differences in States’ Responses to Terror, Terrorism 
and Political Violence 19:369-394, 2007.  Publisher's Official Version: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546550701424075>.  
Open Access Version: http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/
personal security of the President. To keep presidential powers intact, Niyazov’s regime 
has blatantly subdued political and religious opponents and placed bans on political 
pluralism, religious diversity or alternative expression.21 After an alleged assassination 
attempt on the President in November 2002, which Niyazov survived unhurt, the 
government adopted counterterrorism legislation and created the State Commission on 
Fighting Terrorism and the Department for Counterterrorism and Organized Crime of the 
Ministry of Internal Affair.22 Along with the legislative and institutional changes, state 
authorities intensified oppressive measures and prosecution of the Turkmen.23 By accounts 
of international human rights groups, the criminal police arrested, tortured and tried about 
100 people in relation to the 2002 attack. All trials were closed to pubic and conducted 
with blatant violations of due process. Among those prosecuted were relatives of the exiled 
political opposition.  
The government of Kazakhstan also declared religious extremism as one of the 
threats to national security of Kazakhstan, but chose a more balanced approach to stave off 
Islamic fundamentalism. It has combined coercion and subjugation of political freedoms 
with policies of cooption, control and assimilation of the Islamic forces and appeasement 
of the general public. In 2005, the Parliament of Kazakhstan toughened national religious 
legislation and adopted the law envisaging severe punishment for extremist activities and 
financial help to extremist and terrorist groups.24 Under the pretext of prevention of 
terrorism and religious extremism, the law enforcement authorities conducted inspections 
of religious organizations throughout the country and suspended a number of religious 
groups. In October of 2004, the Supreme Court of Kazakhstan issued a ruling in which it 
recognized Al-Qaeda, the East Turkistan Islamic Party, the Kurdish People’s Congress and 
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the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan as terrorist organizations and prohibited them from 
any activity in the state.  A half of a year later, another Kazakh court banned activities of 
Hizb ut-Tahrir pronouncing this group as an extremist organization. In everyday life, 
however, there have been few arrests of Hizb ut-Tahrir activists and little repression of 
religious activists.25 The legislation of Kazakhstan contains no provisions allowing 
convictions for the distribution of religious literature or following nontraditional Islamic 
practices.26
In the early 1990s, the Kyrgyz republic served as an example of democratic 
development in post-Soviet Central Asia and was described as an ‘island of democracy’ in 
a region with corrupt and repressive political leaders.27 A ‘softer’, more tolerant and 
conciliatory response towards activities of Hizb ut-Tahrir used to set Kyrgyzstan apart 
from its more fierce neighbors. A spokesperson for the Interior Ministry of Kyrgyzstan, 
Joldoshbek Busurmankulov, explained a difference in the republics’ strategies: 
I don't think that we will live 20 years without any Hizb ut-Tahrir, if we 
give them [members of Hizb ut-Tahrir] 30 or 40 years of imprisonment or arrest all 
of them. It will not happen. I think we may fight by alternative ways, different 
methods. We should prove their destructiveness. We should fight for the hearts and 
minds of the people.28
The following example illustrates differences in the ways the Central Asian 
governments have responded to threats. At different times, the presidents of Turkmenistan, 
Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan were targets of assassination attempts. In Turkmenistan, the 
government responded with a wide-spread repression of alleged partakers of the November 
2002 attack. The Turkmen authorities issued orders for the resettlement to remote desert 
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regions all ‘unworthy persons’ living on the border with Uzbekistan. The government of 
Uzbekistan claimed that the bombings that exploded in Tashkent in February 1999 were an 
assassination attempt targeting President Karimov because the incident happened in front 
of a governmental building and at a time when Karimov was scheduled to arrive for a 
meeting of his cabinet.29 A surge of arrests and trials followed the bombings. As a 
remarkable contrast appears the decision of Kyrgyz President Askar Akayev to pardon six 
people convicted of plotting to kill him in 1999. The offenders were sentenced to 14 to 16 
years in prison on charges of preparation for a terrorist attack on Akayev and with an 
attempt to overthrow the country’s constitutional system. First, a city court reduced the 
terms to four and six years on defenders’ appeal; and a year later, all were pardoned by the 
President. 
A series of incursions by Islamic militants and hostage-taking incidents in 1999-
2000 spread fears of radical Islamists in the republic. Poorly prepared to fight off the raids 
of the guerilla force at the time of attacks, the government of Kyrgyzstan undertook a 
reform of the security forces and enhanced security measures in the aftermath of 
incursions. It also intensified and hardened its policies toward terrorism and religious 
extremism. Since 1999, active intelligence and counterintelligence efforts of Kyrgyzstan 
have been focused on the IMU, a militant Islamist group active in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan 
and elsewhere in Central Asia. The government of Kyrgyzstan has also undertaken active 
steps to halt the spread of religious groups’ literature and to track down members of the 
Hizb ut-Tahrir.30 In April 2004, Kyrgyzstan added Hizb ut-Tahrir to the list of banned 
religious extremist groups. Although, the followers of Hizb ut-Tahrir have not been 
implicated in violence in Kyrgyzstan, the government accuses the organization in 
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‘ideological terrorism’, and hampers activities of human rights groups, which speak out 
against the persecution of Hizb ut-Tahrir members.31  
The strategy of repression and violent crackdown has been systematically applied 
to suspected terrorists and their affiliates in Uzbeksitan and Tajiksitan, and much less so in 
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. Turmenistan’s leadership has been using repressive means 
indiscriminately to suppress any opposition to the power of President. What can explain 
variation in counterterrorism responses of the Central Asian states?  
Explaining Differences in Counterterrorism Responses of Central Asian 
States: Theory and Case Studies  
The current state of the literature on states’ responses to terrorism is characterized 
by the lack of cross-sectional and longitudinal analyses of state violence in the name of the 
struggle with terrorism and scarcity of explanations of states’ counterterrorism policies. 
Few empirical analyses attempted to account for states’ choices of different 
counterterrorism measures, and those that did relied on a narrow sample of liberal 
democracies.32  
More general explanations of states’ behavior can be inferred from two competing 
analytical paradigms, namely Rationalism and Constructivism.33 Rationalist theories 
typically explain policy choices by reference to goal-seeking behavior. A state adopts a 
policy if the costs associated with enacting it do not exceed the expected benefits from its 
implementation.34 Constructivists refute the central tenet of rationalist approaches that 
states pursue their exogenously determined interests according to the ‘logic of expected 
consequences.’35 Instead, in their explanations of states’ policy choices constructivists 
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assume that states act as social actors whose interests and identities are shaped by 
commonly held (“intersubjective”) ideas (norms, knowledge, culture, etc.).36  
A widely held belief associating states’ responses to terrorism with the intensity of 
terrorist attacks and states’ capabilities to strike back is informed by the Rationalist 
conception of politics. The governments do what is believed in their best interest to do 
(i.e., to eliminate or minimize the threat of terrorism) given the availability of resources. 
Constructivists note that states’ interests cannot be taken out of an ideational 
context that gives them their meanings. What constitutes an interest or a threat can never 
be stated a priori; ‘it should be approached as a social construction and theorized at that 
level’.37 For constructivists, states’ interests in fighting terrorism and choices of 
counterterrorism policies are defined by social norms and ideas about the nature of terrorist 
threat, and appropriate and legitimate responses to it.  
The problems and shortcomings of Rationalism and Constructivism have been 
extensively discussed in the literature and need not be repeated here.38 The corollary of the 
criticisms is that none of the perspectives can provide a full and adequate explanation of 
states’ responses to terrorism, and their combination might be more productive. This study 
utilizes the tools of both approaches for providing a comprehensive account of the Central 
Asian states’ counterterrorism policies. A synthesis of rationalist and constructivist 
perspectives is feasible when Rationalism and Constructivism are treated pragmatically as 
analytical tools or ‘styles of thought’ to guide through the analysis of state policies.39  
Like Rationalists, this study posits that the magnitude of terrorist attacks will affect 
states’ security measures. The size of states’ material capabilities – security forces, 
financial resources, etc. - will limit the range of their policy options. Given the availability 
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of resources, the intensity of states’ responses to terrorism should be positively related to 
the number and deadliness of terrorist attacks. 
Following constructivists, this paper assumes that the facts of political life do not 
reflect an objective reality, but depend on interpretations of actors experiencing them. The 
acts of political violence, for example, will be imbued with particular meanings depending 
on a common understanding of what constitutes a threat. The extent of application of a 
state’s capabilities will be bound by a general understanding of appropriateness and 
acceptability of the use force. The meanings and knowledge, themselves, are highly 
malleable products of historical and social processes.40  
Due to historical circumstances, the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan came to believe that the threat of terrorism stems 
from activities of radical Islamic groups. Their views on the extent of threat posed by 
radical Islam have varied depending on the circumstances of introduction and practice of 
Islam in the societies of Central Asia. The difference exists between those ethnic groups 
whose nucleus was formed by settled populations and those who had recently been 
nomads.41 Islam has played a more superficial and varied role on the territories of 
Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan formally inhabited by nomads. The sedentary 
people of what is now Uzbekistan and Tajikistan adopted Islam as their main religion 
much earlier and have observed Islamic prohibitions and laws more closely. The 
differences in the way the settled and itinerant populations practiced Islam translated in the 
varied role of religion among the contemporary republics of Central Asia. Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan have experienced greater Islamicisation than Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where 
traditionally less strict adherence to orthopraxis and orthodoxy of Islam prevented it from 
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taking deep roots. 42 The latter factor has affected the Central Asian governments’ views 
on the extent of threat posed by radical Islam. 
Furthermore, constructivists consider states as social actors whose actions express 
collective as well as individual intentionality. The various organizations and institutions to 
which states belong affect their understanding of problems and their choices of policy 
options. It can be expected, then, that ideas about the acceptability of the use of force and 
expectations of other states conveyed in the language of international norms and 
diplomatic statements will also influence counterterrorism policies of the Central Asian 
republics.43
To summarize, deciding on measures to combat terrorism, the governments will be 
driven by their interest in minimizing threats to state security and constrained by the 
availability of resources. The governments’ interpretations of the threat will be shaped by 
ideas about who terrorists are and how much threat they pose. In Central Asia, the 
understanding of the nature of terrorist threat evolved under the impact of knowledge about 
the role of Islamic faith in the societies of Central Asia. Furthermore, views on the use of 
force held by the Central Asian leaders and promoted in the international discourse and 
norms will affect the governments’ choices of measures to combat terrorism. 
Uzbekistan 
On 16 February 1999 six car bombs exploded in the downtown of the Uzbek 
capital killing 16 people and injuring more than 120 others. Such an attack was 
unprecedented in the history of independent Uzbekistan. The official authorities contended 
that the members of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) orchestrated the blasts. 
The IMU is a militant Islamic organization designated as a terrorist group by a number of 
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states. Its original aim was to establish an Islamic state in Uzbekistan in opposition to 
President Karimov’s secular regime.44 Later, the IMU expanded its goals and activities in 
an attempt to create a region-wide Islamic caliphate beginning in Uzbekistan and gradually 
extending into the rest of Central Asia. 
The activities of radical Islamic groups have always alarmed the Uzbek 
government. It is believed that Uzbekistan with its deep Islamic tradition provides fertile 
ground for cultivation of fundamentalism. The settled population that formed the Uzbek 
ethnos converted to Islam in the 8th century.45 During the 10th and 12th centuries, 
Samarkand, Bukhara, and other urban centers, mostly in present day Uzbekistan, were the 
cradle of Islamic renaissance in Central Asia.46 Since then, Islam has become an 
indispensable part of traditions, practices and social structures of the Uzbeks.  
After independence, the revival of Islamic religion in Uzbekistan represented an 
expression of interest in a foundational component of the ‘national heritage’ of Uzbeks.47 
President Karimov attempted to harness religious sentiments to endorse legitimacy and 
ensure public support of his rule.48 Public authorities have been creating and cultivating 
national ideology encompassing elements of Islamic religious doctrine, albeit an official 
interpretation of it. Some devout Muslims in Uzbekistan, the so-called Wahhabis, openly 
opposed Islamic rituals based on the officially permitted interpretations. The more radical 
Islamic groups supported by Saudi, Iranian, Pakistani and Afghan Islamists, sought to 
establish an Islamic state governed by Islamic law.49  
President Karimov has often expressed fears of this radical strain of Islam. He 
believes that radical Islamists and fundamentalists threaten to destabilize the state and 
undermine confidence in the state reformer.50 In the early 1990s, the government cracked 
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down on leaders of radical Islamic groups, which openly criticized official Muslim 
administration or did not demonstrate explicit loyalty to the state.  The February 1999 
explosions exacerbated the government’s fears of the threat of Islamism and provoked 
massive retaliation against people practicing Islam outside the state-run religious 
institutions. 
Since then, the government has routinely accused Islamists, particularly the 
members of the IMU and Hizb ut-Hahrir,51 in all incidents of political violence in 
Uzbekistan. Even the Andijan uprising of 13 May 2005 was blamed on Islamic ‘terrorists’ 
and ‘fanatics’ who sought to create disturbances in the region, topple the government and 
establish an Islamic state.52  
The Uzbek authorities possess all necessary resources for launching a massive 
crack down on Islamic ‘enemies’ of the state. Uzbekistan has the largest population in the 
region, significant natural resources, strongest military power among the five Central 
Asian states, and sufficient police force. The government’s beliefs about the acceptability 
of the use of force allowed law enforcement officials to put the state’s capabilities in 
action. President Karimov was quoted as saying that the strong executive power is 
necessary during certain periods of a state’s development.53  He has explicitly referred to 
the experiences of a powerful Central Asian ruler of late 14th century, Amir Timur 
(Tamerlane). Timur’s reign promoted the consolidation of Islam in the Central Asian 
region and Islam, in turn, was the basis on which Timur united his state.54 President 
Karimov, too, has been using official Islam for consolidating and legitimizing his power, 
when necessary by forceful and oppressive means.  
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The relations of the Uzbek authorities with governments of other states have 
strengthened the conception of radical Islam as the main threat to national security and 
political stability of Uzbekistan. The civil war in Tajikistan reinforced the Uzbek 
government’s view on ‘the dangers of the power-sharing alliance’ with Islamic 
fundamentalist groups, which the Uzbek authorities blamed for the war in Tajikistan. ‘We 
would not want a repeat of the chaos which exists in Tajikistan,’ stated Karimov.55 He 
banned the creation of Islamic political parties and tightened up state security measures 
against Islamists.  
The 9/11 attacks drew terrorism into a sharp focus of international community. The 
Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) outlined various counterterrorism measures that 
are binding on states under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. This landmark 
document for the first time created uniform obligations for all members of the United 
Nations.56 A notable fact is that, while obliging states to adopt extensive counterterrorism 
measures, the resolution does not define terrorism.57 In compliance with international 
counterterrorism norms and resolutions of the Security Council, all Central Asian republics 
toughened domestic criminal legislation and fortified counterterrorism measures that 
included the strengthening of domestic regulations of religious and political freedoms. 
The relations of the Central Asian governments with the United States were an 
important factor in the formulation and implementation of counterterrorism policies in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. The designation of the IMU as a terrorist organization and a 
branch of Al-Qaeda by the US Department of State58 reinforced the determination of the 
Uzbek leaders, as well as the Tajik and Kyrgyz governments, in apprehending and 
liquidating members and supporters of this militant organization. Following the decision of 
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Uzbekistan to lend its Khanabad military air base for staging military and logistic 
operations of American troops in the Afghan campaign, the government of the US 
rewarded Uzbekistan with sharply increased military and economic aid.59
American assistance to Uzbekistan has been conditioned by ‘substantial and 
continuing’ progress in the areas of human rights and the promotion of democracy. Many 
observers believed that until the events surrounding the Andijan apprising of May 2005 the 
US had not fully utilized its leverage to influence human rights practices of Karimov’s 
government.60 After the US government introduced economic and political sanctions 
against the Tashkent authorities in 2005, and even threatened to institute proceedings 
against Karimov in the International Court following the brutal suppression of public 
unrest in Andijan, Uzbekistan ordered the US to leave the Khanabad military base. The 
NATO allies, too, were prohibited from using the Uzbek territory and airspace for their 
operations in Afghanistan.61 International media outlets and foreign non-governmental 
organizations were ordered to discontinue their activities and to leave Uzbekistan. 
Tajikistan 
Tajikistan has probably taken the brunt of political violence, religious extremism 
and terrorism in the region. By different estimates from 60,000 to 100,000 people perished 
in the Tajik civil war (1992-97). Much of the conflict stemmed from the aggravated 
regional differences and fights over resources. Yet, the dispute over the role of Islam in 
state-building contributed to the outbreak of fighting.62 The hostage-taking, assassinations 
and other crimes committed by the renegade fighters, who refused to disarm under the 
terms of the 1997 peace treaty exacerbated the government’s fears of radical Islam. 
Following the lead of the government of Uzbekistan, Tajik authorities began using the 
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label of ‘terrorist’ in reference to remaining antigovernment armed groups. The threat of 
terrorism has also been invoked in reference to activities of an official Islamist party, the 
Islamic Renaissance Party of Tajikistan.63  
The government’s views on the extent of threat posed by Islamists have been 
shaped by an understanding of a significant role that Islam has played in the lives of Tajik 
citizens. Islam has become a substantial and organic part of the culture and history of the 
Tajik people since its introduction in the second half of the 7th century. During the years of 
perestroika, the radical Islamists, who existed in small numbers on the territory of the 
Tajik Soviet Republic (as well as in other parts of the USSR), were able to traverse the 
path from small informal groupings to mass meetings, and the creation of Islamic political 
organizations.64 The prevalence of Islamic values in the minds and hearts of the Tajiks was 
an important factor contributing to this swift transformation. 
The fear of the popularity of Islam among the Tajiks prompted the sharp 
government’s opposition to the creation of the Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) in 1990,65 
notwithstanding its very moderate political platform.66 Supported by the official Tajik 
clergy, the IRP received official registration in November 1991. However, the government 
took all necessary measures to prevent a candidate nominated by the opposition bloc 
uniting democrats and Islamists to win the 1991 presidential elections.67  
The 1997 peace agreement ended the war and legalized the IRP banned in 1993 at 
the onset of fighting. It also formalized a 30 per cent quota of positions in the executive 
branch to the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), an umbrella group led by the IRP.68 
However, the IRP members received posts mostly at lower ranks and well below the 
established quota. The number of IRP representatives in the government structures 
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dropped further after the law enforcement officers began prosecuting former members of 
the UTO.69
The Tajik government continues to view Islamism as one of the main threats to 
national security despite the all time low public support for the IRP and radical Islamic 
groups that are believed to be responsible for fomenting violence in the country. Although 
the IRP has adopted a somewhat conformist position with regard to the government, the 
latter repeatedly accuses the party in the propaganda of ‘extremism’.70
The recent history of bloody war has had an impact on the Tajik government’s 
responses to the threat of terrorism and religious extremism. It is well known that 
governments tend to use past decisions as a base-line for current policy choices.71 The 
peace agreement of 1997 brought the de jure end to the civil war; yet, the government of 
Tajikistan continued to rely on war-like tactics for fending off security risks to the state. 
The government has prolonged its military operations against the rebel fighters and has 
been known for using indiscriminate fire killing and injuring civilians. The government-led 
military units and law enforcement agencies have been reported extorting, kidnapping, 
beating, torturing, looting and inflicting wanton violence against civilians.72
The policies of other states have also affected counterterrorism measures of 
Tajikistan. The Tajik security officials and local human rights activists tend to agree that 
pressure from the Uzbek government on President Emamoli Rakhmonov has led to harsher 
responses to fundamentalism in the republic. As one of the security officers put it, ‘If 
Rakhmonov doesn’t clamp down on Hizb ut-Tahrir, what will Karimov say to him?’73 
Some regional specialists maintain that Uzbekistan in collaboration with the government of 
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Russia contributed to the start of war in 1992 in order to ‘demonstrate the seriousness of 
the threat of Islamic extremism’ in the region.74
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, Tajikistan declared itself a stalwart supporter of 
the international coalition for the fight against terrorism. It intensified effort at combating 
religious extremism and terrorism. Some observers claim that the government of Tajikistan 
has been using the ‘war on terrorism’ as a pretext for settling scores with former civil war 
opponents.75 Following the lead of other Central Asian states, Tajikistan announced that 
Hizb ut-Tahir have had contacts with Al-Qaeda and the Taliban and declared the group as 
a major security threat in 2002.76
Turkmenistan 
During the first decade of independence, Turkmenistan experienced stable, albeit, 
politically repressive existence. It ended unexpectedly 25 November 2002, when a gunman 
fired at a motorcade carrying Turkmen President Niyazov, killing his cortege and 
wounding President’s escort. The leadership of Turkmenistan believes that this only 
‘terrorist’ attack carried out in the state was masterminded abroad by former high-ranking 
governmental officials who had left the country since 1999 and established a new 
opposition group, the National-Democratic Movement of Turkmenistan.77
Radical Islam failed to emerge as a significant opposition force to the leadership of 
Saparmurat Niyazov who eliminated all groups contesting his power during the early years 
of Turkmenistan’s independence. The government deported religious activists who were 
not citizens of Turkmenistan. It strengthened regulations of Islamic relgion and practices 
by introducing censorship of religious printed and audio-production, and establishing strict 
police surveillance over the department of theology at Ashgabad University, the only 
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institution allowed to teach Islamic studies. The Shiite community was also denied 
registration.78 Today, Islam remains under strict governmental control and non-traditional 
religions are blatantly suppressed.  
The harsh means of social control might have obstructed activities of radical 
Islamic groups in Turkmenistan. However, the suppression of religious and political 
freedoms does not provide a complete explanation as to why Islamists have been unable to 
find inroads to the Turkmen society. The repressive policies of neighboring states have 
failed to prevent the spread of radical Islam. There are particular features of Islam in 
Turkmenistan that mitigated the possibility of developing the radical forms of Islam on the 
Turkmen soil. Islam was assimilated into the tribal culture of the Turkmen through the 
activities of the Sufi saints (the so-called ‘shaykhs’) rather than through the ‘high’ written 
Islamic tradition and institutions of sedentary culture. The Turkmen clannish and tribal 
social structures conditioned the impact of Islamic beliefs imported by Sufi missionaries. 
The centuries old loyalties toward the nomadic tribes have softened the impact of Islam in 
Turkmenistan. The modern Turkmen continue to identify more with their tribal culture 
than religion or nationality. The religious and social systems of the Turkmen society have 
preserved the tribal and ethnic loyalties, which, in turn, have effectively diluted the impact 
of radical Islam.79  
These factors explain the Turkmen’s general passivity toward Niyazov’s peculiar 
adoption and adaptation of Islamic faith to his own ends. The president himself has 
assumed the role of a leader of Muslim people and created his own pseudo-religion 
glorifying his personality. He prepared a religious text, the Rukhnam, which is cited in 
mosques and religious schools along with passages from the Quran.80 Niyazov has 
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legalized religious observation and permitted functioning of religious schools in the 
officially secular state. 
The status of a neutral state helps Turkmenistan avoid entering undesirable treaties 
and alliances, thus protecting it from interferences of Western states. The government of 
Niyazov has been fond of its ties with authoritarian China and Iran, which similarly 
deplore Western practices of intervention on human rights matters. The policy of non-
involvement into the internal affairs of the small and inaccessible republic has contributed 
to the strengthening of power by President Niyazov. Niyazov has not been concerned with 
serious consequences from American government, which is interested in natural gas and 
oil that it does not want to transport through Iran. The international community has had 
little interest in the state that does not threaten security of its neighbors and reveals no 
attempts at enforcing its political style abroad.81   
Kazakhstan 
Kazakhstan has never been attacked by Islamic militants, nor had it suffered from 
deadly terrorist violence. On 22 April 2002, the Kazakh security forces detonated a bomb 
hidden on the side of a road used by President Nazarbayev, thus preventing the only 
terrorist attacked deemed to have targeted the government. Another explosion that 
occurred in November 2004 near the office of Kazakhstan’s ruling party, injured one 
passer-by. The Kazakh officials downplayed the incident.82
Untouched by political instability inspired by Islamists, the Kazakh authorities have 
never regarded radical Islam as the principle threat to national security. Yet, the 
government of Kazakhstan considers Islamic fundamentalism as a destabilizing factors in 
the region. The Kazakh officials and experts also believe that constraints on ‘using’ Islam 
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are much stronger in Kazakhstan than in any other Central Asian state. In 1994, some 47 
per cent of the population of Kazakhstan was Muslim, 44 per cent was Russian Orthodox 
and 2 per cent was Protestant.83 The relatively small Muslim population rendered 
insufficient social basis for mobilization by Islamic groups. The majority of those 
identifying with Islamic creed are rather light observers of Islamic prohibitions and laws.84 
Although, Islam spread in the lands of nomadic tribes in 9-10th century, it has never had 
such a prevailing influence among the Kazakh nomads as among the Uzbeks and Tajiks.85
Furthermore, Kazakhstan has a big Russian population, which constitutes a strong 
bloc of support for President Nazarbayev.86 Nazarbayev has been reluctant to identify his 
state too closely with Islamic causes, presenting his nation as a bridge between the Islamic 
East and the Christian West.87  
In the wake of the September 11th terrorist attacks, the rhetoric of Islamic danger 
has become very common. It led the Kazakh government to reassess the potential of 
radical Islam to disrupt the country’s stability.  There have been reports of the rise of 
support for Hizb ut-Tahrir in the south of the country, and some Kazakh officials expressed 
fears of Islamists.88 The suicide bombings that exploded in the capital of Uzbekistan in 
July 2004 caused security concerns to soar in Kazakhstan.89 Following the general 
crackdown on Islam in the region, Kazakh authorities beefed up prosecution of religious 
extremist groups. 
As the wealthiest and the most economically advanced nation of the region, 
Kazakhstan has all necessary resources to crackdown on the leading critics of opposition 
and to stifle any manifestation of radical Islam. Kazakhstan, as well as other Central Asian 
states, received significant military assistance from the US, which allowed the Kazakh 
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government to upgrade its arms arsenals, enhance military training programs and to 
acquire equipment to prevent and respond to terrorist incidents. 90   
Constraints on the ‘use’ of dictatorial power have also been much higher in 
Kazakhstan than in the neighboring states. The business elite represent a strong opposition 
block to Nazarbayev’s government. Kazakhstan, as well as Kyrgyzstan, has relatively 
advanced civil society. President Nazarbayev himself understands that, without necessary 
political institutions, his government would be unable to attract foreign investments and 
sell Kazakhstan’s natural reaches in the world markets91. Furthermore, Nazarbayev asserts 
that his principles of governance reflect values of the society he rules. One of the often-
stated values of the Kazakh people is their openness and tolerance. The Kazakhs often 
stress that their nomadic past has contributed to the greater receptiveness of external 
influences and adaptability of their culture92. It can be surmised that these values of 
openness and tolerance also had bearing on the government’s policy choices. 
Kyrgyzstan 
A former member of the IMU once alleged that Kyrgyzstan ‘has the most favorable 
conditions to carry out terrorist attacks’.93 Indeed, the majority of terrorist acts and Islamic 
incursions took place on the territory of Kyrgyzstan and its neighbor, Tajikistan. Yet, until 
recently, the Kyrgyz government avoided making a serious crackdown on individuals and 
groups suspected of posing a threat to state security. It is possible that Kyrgyzstan has 
lacked capabilities for carrying out mass arrests of terrorist suspects or raiding 
communities suspected of harboring Islamic fighters. For instance, at a time of the IMU 
incursion in Kyrgyzstan in the summer of 1999, the Kyrgyz army was in no condition to 
undertake a protracted campaign in the mountains. Until 1999, the state authorities had 
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given little thought to having a military at all, because Russian border guards were 
protecting the Kyrgyz border. As the economic conditions in the country worsened and the 
national budget shrank, the military and police forces received even less attention. 
On the other hand, Islam has always played a greater role in social and political life 
of the sedentary Uzbek and Tajik Muslims than in the politics and communities of the 
Kyrgyz.94 The ancient Kyrgyz society was based on a nomadic lifestyle and the Kyrgyz 
carried on many traditional tribal beliefs after their nominal conversion. In Kyrgyzstan, as 
in Kazakhstan, Islam has had cultural significance but little apparent impact on everyday 
life of most ethnic Kyrgyz, although there has been considerable regional variation.95 The 
religious opposition in Kyrgyzstan was less politicized, and had a narrower social base. 
Consequently, the government of Kyrgyzstan viewed it as a minor threat to state security. 
In an interview to a Russian newspaper, President Akaev put it straightforward, ‘If I don’t 
have a real problem of religious extremism, why would I create an artificial one?’96
The 1999 raids of Islamic militants did not change the Kyrgyz government’s views 
on the influence of Islam within the country. The state authorities believed that terrorist 
threat originated from outside of the country. A quasi-official public position on the nature 
of terrorist threat that came through in the conversations with Kyrgyz officials was that 
terrorism had been inspired by an unnamed ‘black force’ coming from ‘outside’.97 The 
perception of terrorism as an international threat, as well as limited national capabilities, 
led Kyrgyzstan to seek international help and active collaboration with different states and 
international organizations; which include the UN, the OSCE, the Shanghai Cooperation 
organization, and the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) among others. 
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Explaining their attitudes and responses to religions fundamentalism, the Kyrgyz 
leadership often appealed to tolerance as an intrinsic trait of the Kyrgyz character. Askar 
Akaev, who had ruled the country until April 2005, declared that the principle of the non-
use of force against the Kyrgyz people was an essential part of his political credo.98 In 
response to the Kyrgyz Procurator General who insisted on the ineffectiveness of light 
penalties given to those propagating extremist views,99 President Akaev asserted, ‘only 
ideas should be use to defeat ideas, not repression.’100 Under President Akaev, the Kyrgyz 
Parliament never amended the Kyrgyz penal code with harsher penalties for activities 
involving religious extremism.  
The new government of President Bakiev has demonstrated a more resolute 
approach toward Islamists in the country. The first law signed by the new president was on 
counteracting extremist activity. The stretched definition of extremism provided in the law 
allows prosecuting activists of Hizb ut-Tahrir and other Islamic groups operating in the 
country for extremism.  
According to experts, the Chinese and Uzbek authorities pressed the Kyrgyz 
government to adopt anti-extremist legislation.101 The government of China has long been 
interested in establishing in Kyrgyzstan legal basis for prosecuting the Uighurs. The latter 
are a Turkic-speaking people residing in the northwestern region of China, the majority of 
whom profess Islam. For years, the Chinese authorities have been battling the Uighur 
separatist movement. The government of China has been exerting strong influence over the 
Central Asian states in dealing with Uighurs. Bowing to pressure from China, the 
government of Kyrgyzstan suppressed any support to the Uighurs. In a series of trials, 
which observers labeled as politically motivated, the Kyrgyz courts sentenced Uighur 
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defendants for terrorist bombings and attempts to set up a branch of the Uighur separatist 
movement in Kyrgyzstan.102
Uzbekistan has long been a fervent critic of Kyrgyzstan’s lenient approach to 
Islamism. On 12 April 2002, the governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan signed an agreement on joint action to fight terrorism, as well as political and 
religious extremism. This agreement laid juridical grounds to demand from the Kyrgyz 
government that it takes decisive steps for preventing the recruitment of individuals for 
terrorist activities in other states. The Kyrgyz courts outlawed activities of religious 
organizations banned in Uzbekistan. The Kyrgyz government has not blocked the Uzbek 
secret service’s activities in the country, including occasional abductions and forced 
repatriation of Islamic activists. The liquidation of a prominent ethnic Uzbek religious 
leader, R.O. Kamoluddin, in a joint raid of the Uzbek-Kyrgyz security forces on 6 August 
2006 became an apex of anti-terrorism cooperation of Kyrgyzstan with Uzbekistan.103
Discussion  
Authoritarianism is a long-standing Central Asian tradition that has been preserved 
in all states in the region after their independence. Within this authoritarian context, the 
Central Asian governments chose different responses to terrorism associated with activities 
of radical Islamic groups in the region. Uzbekistan has applied the most repressive 
counterterrorism measures targeting Islamic activists. Similarly, Tajikistan took a very 
tough stance against radical Islamists. In Turkmenistan, President Niyazov has tightened 
his grip over both religious and political activities. Both Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have 
utilized less repressive counterterrorism policies.  
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An untested assumption favored in the academic, political, and media circles is that 
states’ responses to terrorism match the intensity of terrorist attacks and material 
capabilities of states. Neither Turkmenistan, nor Kazakhstan suffered from deadly terrorist 
violence; yet, the governments of both states endorsed vigorous counterterrorism 
measures. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have taken the brunt of terrorism and Islamic 
incursions in the region. However, it is Uzbekistan that has systematically applied the most 
appalling methods of combating terrorism. The counterterrorism responses of the richest 
states of the region, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, and those of the poorest nations, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, differ as well. 
To explain the puzzling differences in states’ responses to terrorism, this study 
relied on a synthesis of Rationalist and Constructivist explanations of state behavior. It 
posited that the intensity of terrorist attacks, as well as states’ capabilities to combat 
terrorism, would affect the brutality of states’ counterterrorism policies. It also assumed 
that governments’ interpretations and reactions to terrorist acts would always be context-
dependent; that is, domestic and international ideational contexts would provide a frame of 
reference for states’ interpretations of and reactions to political acts. 
 The evidence examined in the case studies largely supports the stated propositions. 
The terrorist attacks and Islamists’ incursions demonstrated that terrorist groups, like the 
IMU, operate out of the region and pose a threat to the stability of Central Asia. The 
incidents of terrorism and armed clashes with Islamic fighters sparked off retaliatory 
responses by the governments of Central Asian states.  
Nonetheless, the mere facts of Islamists’ attacks and the damage inflicted by 
terrorist violence are insufficient for gauging the extent of a threat of radical Islam in 
Omelicheva, Mariya Y. Combating Terrorism in Central Asia: Explaining Differences in States’ Responses to Terror, Terrorism 
and Political Violence 19:369-394, 2007.  Publisher's Official Version: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09546550701424075>.  
Open Access Version: http://kuscholarworks.ku.edu/dspace/
Central Asia. Recently, in all Central Asian republics, radical and militant Islam has been 
in retreat. The toppling of the Taliban regime and the destruction of Al-Qaeda strongholds 
in Afghanistan severely weakened the IMU. Other radical groups, like Hizb ut-Hahrir, 
have enjoyed insignificant public support. Radical ideas about the establishment of an 
Islamic state have been alien to the majority of Central Asians. Islamism and religious 
fundamentalism have become associated with the threat of civil war and instability. Many 
people in Central Asia, even in the traditional centers of Islamic piety, have developed 
distrust and hostility toward radical Islamic groups. The threat of resurgence of the militant 
movement and the radicalization of the population continues to exist. However, there are 
good reasons, which are corroborated in field studies, to assume that radical Islamic groups 
have limited capabilities in the region.104    
In spite of this, the Central Asian officials, particularly those in Uzbekistan and 
Tajikistan, claim that the IMU still poses a major threat to their countries and that support 
for radical Islamic groups has been on the rise across the region. To understand the views 
of the Central Asian governments on the extent of threat of Islamism, this study examined 
historical and social circumstances of introduction and the practice of Islam by Central 
Asian societies.  
Islam is a religion of settled people, as it requires a developed urban infrastructure 
for institutionalized Muslim practices. Naturally, the wide steppes populated with itinerant 
tribes provided poor soil for Islam, and the nomadic culture was much more difficult to 
convert.105 Islam has had a less profound influence on the culture and politics of the 
descendants of nomads living in the steppes of Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan 
than on the social and political life of the sedentary Uzbek and Tajik Muslims.106  The 
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governments of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have always viewed radical Islam as a greater 
challenge to their secular regimes than the public authorities of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan 
and Turkmenistan. The Uzbek and Tajik officials feared that radical Islamic groups were 
capable of gaining enough public support to imperil the governing regimes, absent a 
massive government crackdown. 
Also, in Uzbekistan, the belief about the effectiveness and inevitability of tough 
measures at certain stages of national development affected the government’s choices of 
repressive counterterrorism policies. In Tajikistan, a heavy hand of the history of violence 
directed the government to violent counterterrorism responses after the end of the Tajik 
civil war. In contrast, the leaders of Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have invoked the values of 
tolerance and openness, which the Kazakh and Kyrgyz societies traced to their nomadic 
past, to explain their more accommodating approach to radical Islamic groups.  
The contacts of Central Asian states with each other, as well as with other states of 
the world, have influenced their governments’ views on the problem of terrorism in the 
region. Bowing to political pressure from more powerful neighbors, all Central Asian 
governments strengthened their measures against terrorists, religious extremists and 
Islamists. Influenced by the government of President Karimov, the Kyrgyz authorities 
significantly increased security measures against the followers of Hizb ut-Tahrir who have 
sought refuge in Kyrgyzstan. The Tajik officials stepped up prosecution of the former 
UTO fighters and, under political pressure from China, all Central Asian republics 
intensified oppressive measures against the Uighur minority. Moscow also exploited the 
fears of religions extremism and terrorism in the region to revitalize the CIS collective 
security system, to bolster its ties with the Central Asian states in the military sphere and to 
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fight Islamic extremists.107 Cooperation of the Central Asian governments with Russia, 
China and the US attracted significant material rewards and enhanced the status of the 
region in world politics.  
The influence of the other states cannot be understood apart from discourse and the 
social norms that enabled possibilities for certain types of responses to terrorism. The 
speeches and statements of regional and world leaders, news reports and scholarly 
publications have repeatedly stressed the danger arising from activities of Islamists in 
Central Asia. Particularly after the 9/11 attacks and the inception of the global ‘war on 
terror’, the mentioning of the growth of Islamic sentiments has been accompanied by the 
rhetoric of threat and danger. The governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, 
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan got caught in the discourse of the ‘war on terror’, and were 
keen to demonstrate both their support of the global anti-terrorism coalition and their 
ability to cope with the new threat. Even the leaders of Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan began 
to treat all forms of political and social activity within Islam as manifestations of Islamic 
fundamentalism and a prelude to religious and political conflicts. 
There is little doubt that all Central Asian governments have taken advantage of the 
novel context for their own interests: to put increasing pressure on democratic and 
religious opposition and to fortify power of the governing regimes.108 In much of this, the 
international community has been passively complicit. Only international human rights 
organizations put forward scathing criticism of the Central Asian governments’ 
increasingly authoritarian styles. The governing elites, conscious of the strategic 
importance of their states, have exploited the context of the global ‘war on terrorism’, as 
well as the fear of Islamic extremism, to justify and intensify their suppression of dissent, 
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without much concern about international condemnation.109 With their increasingly close 
relationships to the US and heightened international profile, all governments appeared 
confident that derogations of human rights within their borders would have no diplomatic 
consequences.  
An important pattern in the escalation of radical Islamic threat emerged from the 
analysis of case studies. The broad radicalization of Islamic groups seeking to challenge 
the secular nature of the newly independent states was a response to the persecution and 
reprisals inflicted upon the early manifestation of political Islam by the governments of 
some Central Asian states. The iron-hand policies toward radical Islamic groups provoked 
a reciprocation of violence and the appearance of militant terrorist groups in the region. 
 The state leadership of Uzbekistan launched a full-fledged attack on the 
independent religious opposition in 1993. It initiated a series of mass arrests of 
independent clergy, set restrictions on independent Muslim practices and staged 
‘disappearances’ of influential Islamic leaders. A series of assassinations of public officials 
that took place in the Uzbekistan sector of the Ferghana Valley in December 1997 was a 
reprisal for disappearances of a number of respected imams. The state repression that 
followed the assassinations prompted the creation of the IMU. Those Islamists who 
escaped the 1992 crackdown on the radical Islamic groups became the leaders of the IMU.   
 The radicalization of Islamic movements on the eve of Tajik civil war was a 
consequence of the unwillingness of the Tajik authorities to integrate religious leaders into 
secularized institutions of the government.110 The sluggish and partial implementation of 
the provisions of the 1997 peace agreement provided a continuing raison d’etre for the 
armed gangs formed by the former UTO’s fighters. 
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 An upsurge in the mass repression in Uzbekistan generated the exodus of Islamists 
into the neighboring republics. The intensification of suppression of religious and political 
opponents in those states then increased the popularity of extremist ideologies and groups. 
On the background of worsening economic conditions and plummeting legitimacy of the 
governing elites, those who were persecuted and repressed by the authorities enjoyed the 
greatest popularity among the peoples of Central Asia.111
 The observed pattern of the escalation of religious dissent, which was a response to 
indiscriminate retaliatory responses, is largely consistent with the literature on the impact 
of state repression on public dissent. Rational choice approaches assume that state 
repression significantly increases costs for achieving dissidents’ goals.112 If a state 
responds with repression to violent behavior, it will prompt the dissidents to abandon 
violence. If the state represses non-violent dissent, the dissidents will escalate their 
behavior to violent forms of protest. Additionally, research has demonstrated that state 
repression may have an immediate deterrent effect. However, in the long run, it will 
generate a lagged stimulus for a new protest activity.113 The repression of radical, non-
violent groups, like Hizb ut-Tahrir, and the prosecution of moderate Muslims practicing 
their faith outside of religious confines established by the Central Asian governments have 
been associated with the lagged escalation of violent behavior in the Central Asian region.  
To avoid future instability, growth of extremist groups and radicalization of the 
population, all Central Asian states need to re-examine their policies towards Islam. The 
governments have to introduce changes to their counterterrorism strategies, placing less 
emphasis on indiscriminate repression and retaliatory violent methods.114 The implications 
of indiscriminate violence and the suppression of religious and political freedoms are 
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steep. Violence creates violence. It raises doubts about the legitimacy of fighting terrorism 
as a global objective and turns people away from the democratic values championed by the 
leaders of the global anti-terrorism coalition. 
Conclusion 
The governments of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan have been determined to eliminate the threat of terrorism in the region. The 
states’ public authorities yielded to exigencies of national security, as well as the political 
survival of the governments in power, and surrendered respect for human rights. Yet, the 
extent of the violence of counterterrorism responses differed across the Central Asian 
republics. To explain this intriguing variation, this study relied on the tenets of Rationalism 
and Constructivism about the impact of political violence, the ideas about the nature of 
terrorist threat and states’ capabilities and views on the appropriateness of the use of force 
on the states’ counterterrorism policies.  
In all Central Asian states, the threat of terrorism became associated with activities 
of radical Islamic groups in the region. The Central Asian governments’ understanding of 
security risks related to terrorism, religious extremism and Islamism was contingent not 
only on the magnitude of political violence and terrorism in the region, but also on the 
circumstances of introduction and practice of Islam in the societies of Central Asia. 
Not only the states’ capabilities to combat terrorism, but also the differing views on 
the acceptability of repressive policies, the varied role of violence and the use of force have 
affected the scale of repression within the Central Asian republics. The contacts of Central 
Asian states with each other, as well as with other states of the world, have also influenced 
their governments’ views on the problem of terrorism in the region.  
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The study illuminated some areas for future research. First, it demonstrated how 
international environment can influence the policies of newly independent states. It showed 
how international apathy can perpetuate and reinforce inhuman and unlawful practices in 
the states. It illustrated how the context of the ‘war on terrorism’ can provide a golden 
opportunity for undemocratic regimes to curb domestic opposition. Further analysis is 
required to explore conditions under which international norms, expectations of other 
states and international context affect foreign and domestic policies of states.  
 The case studies revealed that disproportionably stern governmental measures 
caused a backlash among the opposition movements. A future study should examine the 
question of a dynamic interaction between repressive counterterrorism policies and 
terrorism. The outbreaks of violence in the Central Asian states suggested that the strategy 
of governmental reprisals is failing and it raised the question of whether draconian 
approaches can only exacerbate an already precarious situation. It has been argued that 
repressive responses by authorities are counterproductive and that those states with policies 
conforming to the goals and principles of the UN Charter are likely to be the ones least 
affected by terrorism.115
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